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Abstract—The physical-layer security issue in the multiple
non-regenerative wireless-powered relay (WPR) networks is in-
vestigated in this letter, where the idle relay is treated as a
potential eavesdropper. To guarantee secure communication, the
destination-based artificial noise is sent to degrade the receptions
of eavesdroppers, and it also becomes a new source of energy
powering relays to forward the information with power splitting
(PS) technique. We propose an efficient algorithm ground on
block-wise penalty function method to jointly optimize PS ratio
and beamforming to maximize the secrecy rate. Despite the
nonconvexity of the considered problem, the proposed algorithm
is numerically efficient and is proved to converge to the local op-
timal solution. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed
algorithm outperforms the benchmark method.
Index Terms—Energy harvesting, non-regenerative relaying,
power splitting (PS), beamforming, multiple wireless-powered
relays, physical-layer security, artificial noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) is a promising solution for prolonging the lifetime
of energy-constrained wireless nodes [1]. Due to its efficient
utilization of wireless spectrum to harvest energy and process
information from the same wireless signal, SWIPT triggers
a great deal of research interests in cooperative transmission
[2]–[5]. Two protocols, namely time switching (TS) and power
splitting (PS), were proposed for energy harvesting relay with
SWIPT in [2]. TS enabled relay utilize different time blocks
to realize information processing (IP) and energy harvesting
(EH), while relay proportionally split the received signal power
to accomplish these two operations separately in PS protocol.
In [3], the authors investigated a multiple-antenna relay system
with SWIPT where a “harvest-and-forward” strategy was
proposed to maximize the achievable rate. Meanwhile, the
authors in [4] investigated power allocation strategies and their
impact on the multiple source-destination pair networks with
an EH relay. And the performance of a large-scale network
with multiple transmitter-receiver pairs with/without relaying
was discussed in [5], where receivers employed PS technique
to harvest energy.
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Recently, with the rapidly developed SWIPT technologies,
physical (PHY)-layer security has attracted significant atten-
tion in SWIPT with application to wireless networks. As is
mentioned in [6], [7], EH receivers are generally deployed
sufficiently close to the transmitter than information receivers
(IRs) to achieve higher signal power. This gives rise to
a challenging PHY-layer security issue that EH receivers
may easily eavesdrop the confidential information with better
channels, rather than harvest energy as they are presumed to
do. To resolve this issue, substantial research efforts have
been dedicated to SWIPT with the consideration of PHY-
layer security [6]–[9]. The authors in [6] investigated secrecy
wireless information and power transfer with joint informa-
tion and energy beamforming design in multi-input single-
output (MISO) system, while the dual use of artificial noise
(AN) and energy signals for facilitating simultaneous secure
communication and energy transfer with MISO beamforming
was introduced in [7]. The authors in [8], [9] split the power
at the transmitter to send confidential message to IR and
an AN to interfere ER against eavesdropping. Moreover, the
secrecy problem in cooperative networks with SWIPT was
considered in [10]–[12]. The authors in [10] focused on secure
relay beamforming for SWIPT in one-way relay systems with
an external eavesdropper and EH receiver. Meanwhile, the
authors in [11], [12] investigated a wireless-powered jammer
system, where the jammer (e.g. idle EH receiver [12]) could
harvest energy from the wireless signal and use it to interfere
with the external eavesdropper. However, these works [10]–
[12] associated with cooperative transmission did not consider
that EH receivers may intercept the confidential information
intended for IRs.
Motivated by the aforementioned problem, in this letter, we
consider a multiple non-regenerative wireless-powered relay
(WPR) networks, which is different from the scenario in [3]
with only one WPR. In this networks, WPRs are supposed
to harvest energy to assist the source-destination transmission
when active. However, when the relay is idle, it may become
a potential eavesdropper in the network, and maximize its
decoding signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), rather than split power
for cooperative transmission. To improve the security of the
source-destination transmission, the destination-based AN is
applied to our scenario to degrade the receptions of idle
relays, which also becomes a new source of energy powering
WPRs in the second-hop transmission. Distinguished from the
exhaustive search for PS ratio in [3], we propose an algorithm
based on block-wise penalty function method to find the local
optimal PS ratio and optimize beamforming for each WPR
to maximize the secrecy rate with much less computational
time. Despite the nonconvexity of the considered problem, the
proposed algorithm is numerically efficient and is proved to
2converge to the local optimal solution. Numerical experiments
manifest the superior performance of the proposed scheme as
compared with the benchmark method.
Notation: We adopt the notation of using boldface for
column vectors (lower case), and matrices (upper case). The
hermitian transpose is denoted by the symbol (·)†. For a
complex scalar x, its complex conjugate is denoted by x∗.
E[·] and CN (·) denote the statistical expectation and complex
Gaussian distributions, respectively. For vector x, diag(x)
means putting x on the main diagonal.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a two-hop parallel relay networks where a source
S, a destination D and a set of relay nodes (ri, i = 1, · · · , N )
are all equipped with a single antenna. Each ri can assist
the source-destination transmission when active. In this paper,
we assume that the active relay ri can not only process the
received signal, but also harvest energy from it to help S
forward the information resorting to PS technique. However,
when the relay is idle, it may become a potential eavesdropper
in the network, and maximize its decoding SNR, rather than
split the power for cooperative transmission. What’s worse, if
the idle relay is closer to S or other active relays, it can easily
eavesdrop the confidential information with better channels.
To guarantee secure communication, at the time of con-
fidential signal transmission, D concurrently sends AN to
the area of relay nodes to degrade the channel conditions of
idle relays. At the second hop, ri amplifies and forwards the
received signal to D depending on its harvested energy. In
this circumstances, AN can not only be used to degrade the
receptions of eavesdroppers, but also become a new source
of energy powering the information delivering from relays
to D [7]. This scenario is potentially applicative for sensor
networks where a sink node with conventional supply of power
wants to send its data to sensors far away from it. So the sink
node asks for the help of some intermediary sensor nodes.
However, the intermediary sensor is not willing to help the
sink node due to the limited battery capacity. Hence, SWIPT
is employed to encourage those intermediary sensors to use the
harvested energy to participate in cooperative communication
[13]. Nevertheless, in this application, some idle sensors may
prefer to eavesdrop the legitimate information, rather than help
the cooperative transmission, which incurs serious challenges
to the PHY-layer security.
Denote the channel responses from S to ri, from D to
the active ri and from ri to D by hsi ∈ C, hdi ∈ C and
hid ∈ C, ∀i. At the first hop, S sends the legitimate signal xs
to relay nodes, meanwhile, D transmits AN xd to confound
the potential eavesdroppers in the area of relay nodes. The
received signal at relay ri can be expressed as
yi = hsixs + hdixd + ni, (1)
where ni ∈ C represents the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) associated with relay node ri following the distri-
bution CN (0, σ2i ), meanwhile, xs and xd are the transmitted
symbols of S and D with the conventional energy supplies,
such as E[xsx∗s] = Ps and E[xdx∗d] = Pd. Based on PS
scheme, ρi denotes the ratio of power split for EH, and the
left power for IP is (1−ρi) at ri. Hence, the parts of received
signal for EH and IP at ri are written as follows, respectively
yEHi =
√
ρi(hsixs + hdixd + ni), (2)
yIPi =
√
1− ρi(hsixs + hdixd + ni) + nci, (3)
where nci ∈ C is the additive noise introduced by signal
conversion from the passband to baseband with the distribution
CN (0, σ2ci) at ri. The harvested energy of ri is given by
P EHi = ηρi
(
Ps|hsi|2 + Pd|hdi|2 + σ2i
)
, (4)
where η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the energy conversion efficiency from
signal power to circuit power.
In order to get more insight of this relay networks, we
assume that there is only one idle relay (rN+1) eavesdropping
the legitimate information in this letter, and denote it as
the potential eavesdropper (E). The channels from S to E ,
from D to E and from ri to E are given by hse, hde
and hie, ∀i. Therefore, the received signal-to-interference-and-
noise ratio (SINR) of E at the first hop can be written as
SINRe,1 = Ps|hse|
2
Pd|hde|2+σ2e
, and σ2e is the AWGN at E .
We denote wi as the scalar beamformer at relay ri, and
utilize it to deal with the received signal at the corresponding
relay node. Assuming perfect self-interference cancellation,
the received signal of D at the second hop can be given by
yd =
∑N
i=1
√
1− ρihidwihsixs +∑N
i=1
√
1− ρihidwini +
∑N
i=1
hidwinci + nd, (5)
where nd is the AGWN introduced by the receiver antenna at
D with the distribution CN (0, σ2d). For notational convenience,
we make σ2i = σ2ci = σ2e = σ2d = σ2, ∀i in the following parts.
Making use of matrix-vector expressions, the achievable rate
of D can be written as
Rd(w,ρ)=log2
(
1+
w†BρG1Bρw
w†BρQ1Bρw +w
†Q1w + σ
2
)
, (6)
where G1 = Psg1g
†
1, and g1 = [h1dhs1; · · · ;hNdhsN ] ∈
CN×1. w = [w1; · · · ;wN ] ∈ CN×1, ρ = [ρ1; · · · ; ρN ] ∈
CN×1, Bρ = diag
(√
1− ρ1, · · · ,
√
1− ρN
)
, and Q1 =
diag
(|h1d|2, · · · , |hNd|2)σ2.
To maximize the eavesdropping rate, E combines the two
received signals in both stages using maximal ratio combining
(MRC), and its achievable rate is given by
Re(w,ρ)= log2
(
1 +
Ps|hse|2
Pd|hde|2 + σ2+
w†BρG2Bρw
w†BρG3Bρw+w†BρQ2Bρw+w
†Q2w+σ
2
)
, (7)
where G2 = Psg2g
†
2 and g2 = [h1ehs1; · · · ;hNehsN ] ∈
C
N×1; G3 = Pdg3g
†
3, g3 = [h1ehd1; · · · ;hNehdN ] ∈ CN×1,
and Q2 = diag
(|h1e|2, · · · , |hNe|2)σ2.
3III. PROBLEM FORMULATION FOR SECRECY RATE
MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we investigate the joint PS and beamforming
design to maximize the secrecy rate Rsr, which is given by
Rsr(w,ρ) =
1
2
[Rd(w,ρ)−Re(w,ρ)]+ , (8)
where [a]+ = max(0, a), and 12 is from the fact that the
source-destination transmission takes place in two time slots.
For the considered scenario in this paper, the optimization
problem can be written as
max
w,ρ
Rsr(w,ρ) (9)
s.t. |wi|2
[
(1− ρi)Ps|hsi|2 + (1 − ρi)Pd|hdi|2+
(2− ρi)σ2
] ≤ P EHi , ρi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i = 1, · · · , N,
where the transmit power of ri is constrained by the harvested
energy at ri, ∀i. It is noted that the considered optimization
problem (9) is non-convex, and the combined inequality con-
straints further increase the difficulty to globally solve (9)
with respect to the two coupled blocks of variables (w,ρ). In
order to handle the nonconvexity and inequality constraints, we
introduce the penalty function method [14] into our problem.
Before that manipulation, formulation (9) should be equiva-
lently transformed into the following problem with the newly
introduced slack variable ψ,
max
w,ρ,ψ
Rsr(w,ρ) (10)
s.t. |wi|2
[
(1− ρi)Ps|hsi|2 + (1− ρi)Pd|hdi|2+
(2− ρi)σ2
]
+ ψi − P EHi = 0, ρi ∈ [0, 1],
ψi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, · · · , N.
Further let us define the following penalty function
f(w,ρ,ψ, λ)=Rsr(w,ρ)−λ
∑N
i=1
∣∣|wi|2 [(1− ρi)Ps|hsi|2
+(1− ρi)Pd|hdi|2 + (2 − ρi)σ2
]
+ ψi − P EHi
∣∣2 , (11)
where the second term represents the penalty term constituted
by a total of N constraints in (10), λ denotes the penalty
parameter. Notice that problem (10) is equivalently rewritten
as the maximization problem of (11) constrained by the
feasible set of (10), in which the penalty term equals zero.
If the obtained solutions are not feasible, which violate the
constraints of (10), the penalty term may increase much with
the quadratic growth, resulting in lower value of (11). The
penalty function is introduced to balance the secrecy-rate
performance against the penalty term through the setup of
λ. Therefore, the key idea of penalty function method is to
increase the penalty parameter λ progressively in order to
obtain an optimal feasible solution of (10).
In consideration of the problem structure, we further in-
troduce Block Coordinate Gradient Descent (BCGD) Method
[15] into our problem, which can be utilized to handle the
large-scale multiple-block problem by computing and unifying
each block variable through sequential updating. And the
target of each update in our proposed algorithm is to increase
the value of (11) by reducing the penalty term or enhancing
TABLE I
THE BLOCK-WISE PENALTY FUNCTION METHOD
Initialization: Generate feasible block variables (w0,ρ0,ψ0)
and penalty parameter λ0.
S1: For k = 1, · · · ,K , do S2–S3 until converge
S2: For i = 1, · · · , N , do
(1) wk+1i = wki + αwidwi (wkt(i),ρk,ψk , λk), ∀i;
(2) ρk+1i = ρki + βρidρi (wk+1,ρkt(i),ψk, λk), ∀ρi ∈ [0, 1];
(3) ψk+1i = ψki + γψidψi (wk+1,ρk+1,ψkt(i), λk), ∀ψi ≥ 0.
Note that αwi , βρi and γψi are the step sizes in each update,
and can be obtained by
Armijo stepsize rule: For the considered maximization problem,
choose 0 < αinit ≤ 1 and σˆ, β ∈ (0, 1). Let αmax be the largest
element in {αinitβm}m=0,1,··· satisfying
f(xk+1)− f(xk) ≥ σˆαmax∇f(xk)′dˆk,
where xk can be replaced by wki , ρki and ψki , ∀i, and ∇f(xk)
turns to be the partial derivative of f with respect to xk , i.e.,
∂f
∂x
(xk). And dˆk is the ascent direction for our problem.
The ascent direction dwi (wkt(i),ρ
k,ψk, λk) is set as follows
dwi (w
k
t(i)
,ρk,ψk, λk) = − ∂f
∂wi
(wk
t(i)
,ρk,ψk, λk).
Similarly, the other two dρi(wk+1,ρkt(i),ψ
k, λk) and
dψi(w
k+1,ρk+1,ψk
t(i), λ
k) can be achieved.
S3: Stopping Criteria (Sequential Convergence)
If min
{
‖wk+1−wk‖2
‖wk+1‖2
,
‖ρk+1−ρk‖2
‖ρk+1‖2
,
‖ψk+1−ψk‖2
‖ψk+1‖2∑N
i=1
∣∣∣|wk+1i |2
[
(1−ρk+1i )Ps|hsi|
2+(1−ρk+1i )Pd|hdi|
2
+(2 − ρk+1i )σ
2
]
+ ψk+1i − P
EH
i,k+1
∣∣∣2
}
≤ ǫ,
Stop and return (wk+1,ρk+1,ψk+1);
Else Set λk+1 = cλk(c ≥ 1), k := k + 1 and go to S1.
End
Rsr. With the help of Armijo stepsize rule (refer to Table I),
the monotonic increment of (11) is guaranteed in each update.
When the stopping criteria is met according to Table I, the
constraints of (10) are all satisfied, making the penalty term
equal zero, and the local optimal solutions are obtained.
The block-wise penalty function method is a combination
of penalty function method and BCGD method, the details of
which are given in Table I, where ǫ is the tolerant error, wk
t(i),
ρk
t(i) and ψ
k
t(i) are the temporary vectors with latest updated
information instead of wk, ρk and ψk,
wkt(i) = (w
k+1
1 ; · · · ;wk+1i−1 ;wki ;wki+1; · · · ;wkN ),
ρkt(i) = (ρ
k+1
1 ; · · · ; ρk+1i−1 ; ρki ; ρki+1; · · · ; ρkN ),
ψkt(i) = (ψ
k+1
1 ; · · · ;ψk+1i−1 ;ψki ;ψki+1; · · · ;ψkN ).
Before presenting the convergence result, we first assume
the feasible set is nonempty, which means that there is at least
one feasible point of (10). Next we have the following result:
Theorem 3.1: Any limit point of the sequence
{wk,ρk,ψk} generated by the proposed block-wise penalty
function method is a Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) point of
problem (10).
Proof. First let (w∗,ρ∗,ψ∗) be any limit point of the se-
quence {wk,ρk,ψk}. Due to the property of Armijo stepsize
rule, we have the monotonic increment of f(wk,ρk,ψk, λk),
4and obtain the following inequality
f(w0,ρ0,ψ0, λ0)<f(wk,ρk,ψk, λk)
=Rsr(w
k,ρk)− λkµ(wk,ρk,ψk). (12)
Rearranging (12), we have
λkµ(wk,ρk,ψk)<Rsr(w
k,ρk)−f(w0,ρ0,ψ0, λ0)<∞,(13)
where µ(wk,ρk,ψk) represents the second term without λ in
(11). Considering the boundedness of Rsr and the property of
the limit point (w∗,ρ∗,ψ∗), we have λ∞µ(w∗,ρ∗,ψ∗) <∞.
Because λ∞ → ∞, we can deduce µ(w∗,ρ∗,ψ∗) = 0 and
(w∗,ρ∗,ψ∗) is a feasible point of (10). If (w∗,ρ∗,ψ∗) is not
a KKT point, there should be another feasible point (w˜, ρ˜, ψ˜)
making
Rsr(w˜, ρ˜) > Rsr(w
∗,ρ∗). (14)
Further, let us consider the subsequence {ki}, where
lim
i→∞
(wki ,ρki ,ψki) = (w∗,ρ∗,ψ∗), so that
lim
i→∞
f(wki ,ρki ,ψki ,λ)=f(w∗,ρ∗,ψ∗, λ)
(a)
=Rsr(w
∗,ρ∗), ∀λ,
where (a) is from the fact that the penalty term of (11) equals
zero at point (w∗,ρ∗,ψ∗) With a view to (14), for large
enough ki, we have
f(w˜, ρ˜, ψ˜, λki)
(b)
=Rsr(w˜, ρ˜)>Rsr(w
∗,ρ∗)≥f(wki ,ρki ,ψki ,λki),
which is a contradiction to the ki-th iteration with respect to
λki , where (b) is due to the fact that (w˜, ρ˜, ψ˜) is a feasible
point of (10) making the second term of (11) equal zero. 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we investigate the performance of the
proposed algorithm (PA) via numerical simulations. The path
loss model for the energy harvesting relay channel is Rayleigh
distributed and denoted by |β|2d−2, where |β| and d represent
the short-term channel fading and the distance between two
nodes. |β|2 follows the exponential distribution with unit mean
[3]. The position of each node is given in Fig.1. We set
the noise power as σ2 = −40dBm, the energy conversion
efficiency η = 0.5, the penalty parameter λ = 35, the constant
c = 1.2 and the initial PS ratio ρi = 0.1, ∀i for all simulations
results, which are averaged over 100 channel realizations.
A benchmark method is set as a comparison, named as
simple amplify-and-forward (SAF) scheme, where we per-
form exhaustive search to obtain the power splitting ratio
for each relay, and apply a simple amplified scalar θi with
the consideration of power constraint at the relay, where
θi =
√
P EHi / [(1− ρi)(Ps|hsi|2 + Pd|hdi|2 + σ2i ) + σ2ci], ∀i.
The comparisons of secrecy rate performance achieved by
PA and SAF are evaluated in Fig.2 with fixed Pd = 40dBm.
For the special case N = 1, it is observed that SAF achieves
a better performance than PA. The reason is that SAF can get
the global optimal PS ratio by exhaustive search in this case,
where PA just obtains a local optimal one, but the performance
of PA approaches to be optimal in the whole region of SNRs,
which indicates that PA is accurate and effective. When N =
5, PA outperforms SAF in the whole region of SNRs.
In Fig.3, we show the performances yielded by different
number of relays and by different Pd resorting to PA and
SAF with fixed Ps = 40dBm, respectively. When the power
of AN is enhanced, both PA and SAF enjoy a better secrecy
rate due to the weakened reception of eavesdropper. Moreover,
it is noted that as the number of relays increases, more WPRs
are participating in cooperative transmission yielding higher
performances, meanwhile, PA achieves the maximum secrecy
rate and the increasing performance gap withN is notably seen.
Fig.4 is presented to demonstrate the convergence result of
PA, where we give the convergence result of PS ratio and the
secrecy rate versus iteration times. Notice that the PS ratio ρ
of each relay will finally converge to its own local optimal
solution as the iteration times increases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy rate maximization
problem in multiple non-regenerative wireless-powered relays
networks based on power splitting scheme, which has not
been studied yet in the literature. We propose an algorithm
resorting to block-wise penalty function method to jointly
optimize power splitting and beamforming for all active relays,
which outperforms the benchmark. And we also prove that the
proposed algorithm can converge to a local optimal solution.
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